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ABOUT THE HUNGARIAN MONETARY POLICY
When the financial crisis drama started, Hungary was exceptionally vulnerable to 
it due to its pre-crisis policy mistakes, high debt, and the lack of international re-
serves. Thus anti-cyclical policy measures could not be implemented. Therefore, 
particularly painful, pro-cyclical austerity policies had to be taken. These meas-
ures, in turn, opened the door for populist policies. After the 2010 election, the 
new government formed by the Fidesz party relied on its supermajority to adopt 
sweeping constitutional changes and unorthodox economic policies. Since then, 
a growing financial nationalism distinguishes Hungary from its European part-
ners. Through confrontations with the Fidesz govern ment, the Hungarian Central 
Bank (MNB) had retained its independence, but after the appointment of a new 
Governor in 2013, a U-turn followed in monetary policy. Major changes occurred 
both in organisational and in political terms. Ten measures of a “well-functioning 
Hungarian banking system” (Fábián – Vonnák 2014) have been implemented, but 
the inflation targeting as monetary policy regime remained.
When the previous central banker management’s mandate expired in 2013, 
they preferred not to talk in front of the public, and refrained from criticising the 
monetary policy of the ensuing era’s steps and decisions. This gentleman’s credo 
changed at a very interesting panel discussion of the Budapest Economic Forum 
held on October 2, 2014, in Budapest. The title of the discussion was “Cen-
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tral bank governors among themselves: Manoeuvring room of the Hungarian 
economy in the world”. This report summarises this debate and illustrates it with 
figures and time series of the Hungarian monetary policy (inflation, base rate, FX 
rate, reserves, and loans).
The participants
More than 200 experts participated at the Budapest Economic Forum 2014 
conference, which had a monetary policy section, whose moderator was István 
Madár, Senior Analyst of the economic and financial on-line news website Port-
folio. The members of the section were the former MNB governors: Péter Ákos 
Bod (1991–1994), György Surányi (1990–1991 and 1995–2001), Zsigmond Járai 
(2001–2007), Vice-governors Ferenc Karvalits (2007–2013) and Ádám Balog 
(since 2013). The previous and the present governors, András Simor (2007–2013) 
and György Matolcsy (since 2013), were absent from this event. 
The debate
The first theme of the conversation was that having an enlarged role and using 
more instruments is normal for the central banks when there is a financial melt-
down. Bod mentioned that there would a general global consensus that day when 
the responsibility for system stability defines key objectives and tasks for central 
banks (see, for example, Benati – Goodhart 2008).
According to Ádám Balog, the MNB supports and strengthens financial stabil-
ity with the resources at its disposal, especially after it merged with the Hungar-
ian Financial Supervisory Authority in 2013 in order to ensure harmony between 
micro-prudential regulatory supervision of the individual risks of institutions 
operating in the financial intermediation system on the one hand, and macro-
prudential regulatory supervision, which monitors systemic risks posing a threat 
to the entire financial system, on the other.
According to Bod, it is difficult to find the responsible person or institution in 
times of crisis. Nevertheless, politicians around the world were quick to put all 
the blame on the commercial banks. But in reality, the authorities were responsi-
ble, too. They should have regulated long before the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers. Járai mentioned that the current management of MNB did completely differ-
ent things than the previous one. Járai’s contention was questioned by Karvalits 
who said that when Járai was the governor, he acted in exactly the opposite way 
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as Járai had just said – according to Karvalits, Járai used to argue in favour of a 
strong HUF for the weak economy.1 
Járai replied that different instruments were needed in different times. Kar-
valits argued in favour of a more flexible inflation targeting monetary regime. 
Surányi noted that there was nothing new among the measures of the ECB and of 
the FED, and that central banks had been using these instruments for a hundred 
years, for example open-market transactions and quantitative easing. According 
to him, the FED acted much better than the ECB. Surányi contended that the 
Inflation Targeting (IT) regime had failed, and today the world was facing the 
threats of a deflation; he continued by noting that there was no longer a “Spanish 
Curtain” between monetary and fiscal policies. According to him, for many years 
prior to the crisis, the MNB believed in the self-regulating nature of the financial 
markets and in their efficiency. It assigned itself the role of a “night watchman”, 
and rejected out of hand any approaches that ran contrary to this. 
Balog resented that the novelty and originality of the recent measures of the 
MNB were not acknowledged by the participants. According to the present vice-
governor, they are trying, and succeeding, in finding less orthodox solutions to 
problems through the concerted application of monetary policy. 
Infl ation and exchange rate data
Balog said that even though Hungary had adopted the IT regime in June 2001, it 
could not have worked until the recent times. The reason was that by maintaining 
a range until the spring of 2008, there was an interventional zone, then the crisis 
set in, and therefore the MNB could not really focus on IT. However, after that 
period, the circumstances allowed it. Surányi mentioned that before 2013, the 
core inflation had been lower than the headline inflation, but despite that, the cen-
tral bank modified the base rate in connection with the headline inflation level. 
The tendency today seems to be the opposite: the core inflation is higher than the 
headline inflation (see Figure 1). Balog was working with incorrect data: the core 
inflation and the constant tax rate index is 1.5%, therefore the inflation target has 
been reached (see Figure 2). After this personal insult, Surányi remarked that it 
was regrettable that Balog did not understand the basic connections of the theory. 
Like a teacher, Surányi explained in front of the audience that the inflation target 
was 3 ± 1%, so if inflation was 1.5%, it would not not satisfy the criterion.
1 According to the author of this report, if we examine Table 1 we can see that Karvalits was 
right: Járai never voted to decrease the prime rate between 2005 and 2007, while Karvalits voted 
the most (46 times) to maintain the rate between 2007 and 2013.
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If we look outside Hungary, the effectiveness of IT regimes is subject to heated 
debates even in big, closed, developed economies, while in the small, open econ-
omies of Central and Eastern Europe, the track record of IT regimes is very poor. 
A long series of empirical studies have already proven that the interest rate chan-
nel in these countries is much weaker than the FX-rate channel. One may or may 
not believe in IT regimes, but it cannot be disputed that the only effective tool of 
the central bank is the FX rate – in a small, open economy. Hence, a central bank 
operating under an IT regime should, in practice, target the FX rate and adjust its 
Figure 2. Inflation and targets, 2011–2014
Source: MNB.
Figure 1. Core inflation – year-on-year changes
Source: MNB.
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interest rate level to the “implicit” FX target that is consistent with the inflation 
goal (Surányi 2009, 2010). 
According to the author of this report, the major risk of the IT regime in an 
open, export oriented small economy like Hungary is that the central bank cannot 
intervene in the currency market. Figure 3 demonstrates the changes of the HUF 
exchange rates between 2007 and 2014. 
The monetary council decreased the prime rate in long term (Figure 4). During 
the Lehman crisis, the council raised the reference rate by 300 basis points. 
Figure 3. EUR exchange rate at the end of the month, HUF, 2007–2014
Source: MNB.
Figure 4. The Hungarian Central Bank’s prime rate, 1990–2014
Source: MNB.
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The interest rates remained unjustifiably high for many years, which contrib-
uted to stimulating domestic demand for foreign currency loans. According to 
Karvalits, their decisions should be judged on the basis of the information that 
was available at the time of the decision making. Even an ex ante risky decision 
might become an ex post good decision, and vice versa, an ex ante responsible 
decision might become an ex post bad decision. 
Table 1
Interest rate decisions of selected members of the Monetary Council, 2005–2014
Members Voted to increase Voted to reduce Voted to maintain Meetings attended
Ádám Balog 0 16 2 18
Zsigmond Járai 8 0 9 17
Ferenc Karvalits 10 15 46 71
György Matolcsy 0 15 2 17
András Simor 12 15 44 71
Note: Non-attributed voting records of the Monetary Council were published until September 
2005, and individual voting records have been published in the minutes since then. On October 22, 
2008, there was an unscheduled interest rate decision; the minutes of that meeting have not been 
published. 
Source: MNB.
If we analyse the rate decisions of the Monetary Council (MC),2 we can state 
that under Governor Simor, there were 74 rate decisions altogether: 42 times 
there was neither base rate raising nor base rate decreasing, 23 times there was 
base rate decreasing, and only 9 times did the MC decide to raise the base rate. 
During the next period, under Governor Matolcsy, there were altogether 19 rate 
decisions: 2 times there was neither base rate raising nor base rate decreasing and 
17 times there was base rate decreasing. Keeping the prime rate (Figure 4) at a 
record level low is a good thing. 
According to Surányi, the first and foremost mistake was the inadequate level 
of foreign exchange reserves that made Hungary among the first to request out-
side assistance, in the form of international credit, in autumn 2008, following 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis. At that time, Hungary was not able 
2  Members of the MC: The Governor, as chairman of the MC, the deputy governors and other 
members, elected by Parliament for six years. Hungarian citizens with outstanding theoretical 
knowledge and practical professional expertise in issues related to monetary, financial or cred-
it institution activities may be appointed or elected members of the MC (See Act CXXXIX of 
2013 on the MNB).
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to accumulate reserves to counterbalance the external shocks – there was a lack 
of reserves that would have enabled fiscal policy to operate anti-cyclically. The 
explanation for this is basically that the central banks of the other countries in the 
region had sufficient international reserves – enough to bridge a few months. In 
stark contrast to this, the MNB’s foreign exchange reserves were low, not only 
relative to the country’s foreign debt, but also in comparison with imports. In this 
respect, Hungary really was the most vulnerable economy in the Central Europe-
an region in autumn 2008. The central bank’s foreign exchange reserves totalled 
16.3 billion euros (Figure 5). The external debt of the Czech Republic, which is 
similar in size and has a similarly open economy, was half the size of Hungary’s, 
but it had reserves of 27 billion euros when the crisis broke out. In proportionate 
terms, this level of reserves was three times of Hungary’s. The MNB’s explana-
tion, officially downplayed, that the international reserve requirement analysed 
using the Guidotti model only pointed to a significant shortage of reserves two 
or three months before the crisis emerged, is not a convincing argument. If the 
decision-makers had simply taken a look at the countries surrounding Hungary, 
and/or applied the best-known rule of thumb – based on the estimation of forex 
reserves measured in terms of import value – then the severe shortage of reserves 
would have been obvious. Measured in terms of import value, the central bank’s 
currency reserve level fell to 2.4 months’ worth of imports, and this obviously 
was not due to an increase in the volume of imports from one day to the next. 
A year later, the country’s foreign exchange reserve exceeded 30 billion euros 
Figure 5. Total reserve assets, million EUR, 1998–2014
Source: MNB.
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(which corresponds to roughly five months’ worth of imports). The low inter-
national reserves, however, prevented the central bank from performing one of 
its basic functions. Even over a short, 3–6-month horizon, the central bank was 
incapable of guaranteeing the liquidity of the Hungarian financial system without 
any major hitches; in other words it was only partially able to fulfil its role as the 
“lender of last resort” (Surányi 2010).
The MNB’s role in providing credit
The negative effects of the tax on banks’ capacity to lend, and therefore on the 
supply of credit, were considerably larger than those on credit demand. The tax 
paid by commercial banks was much higher (as a share of GDP) than from bank 
taxes proposed in Austria, Germany, France, and the UK. Unlike in Hungary, 
each of those governments had to provide capital injections or otherwise inter-
vene in failed institutions since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. If 
we examine the loans, we can see a decrease (Table 2). Without loans, there is no 
growth in the economy. Surányi mentioned that the central bank, playing a part 
in the weakening of the banking system will negatively impact on the Hungarian 
economy in the medium term.  Thus, in violation of the Hippocratic Oath, it did 
harm to the national economy via the punishment of the commercial banks.
Figure 6. Exchange rate, million EUR, 2007–2014 
Source: MNB.
CONFERENCE REPORT 151
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
CONCLUSION
Although the foundations of the Hungarian economy became more solid and 
sound by the autumn of 2014, the country is still unable to retain its ability to 
attract capital. The dilemma was that due to the permanent process of cutting the 
interest rate, the exchange rate of the forint was weakening in spite of a positive 
current account balance. The households’ and the state’s forint denominated debt 
increased and its deleveraging imposed a huge burden on the entire economy, 
in which actors could not increase their consumption and therefore the growth 
lagged behind and there were no investments. 
I prefer not to conclude the paper with the assumption that irresponsible eco-
nomic policies will be pursued in Hungary over the medium term. But in that 
case, the country had better become a member of the Euro zone as soon as pos-
sible, where the monetary policy is driven by the European Central Bank. If Hun-
gary still prefers not to become a member of the Euro zone, more public debates 
like the one organised by Portfolio should be held. Let me close this report by 
voicing my pessimism about the forthcoming events regarding the international 
and Hungarian monetary policy.
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